International law on children's rights, in important ways, usurps state authority over the ideology of childhood, establishing complicated and exacting standards that all states should adopt. The international community's enshrinement of children as rights holders and consolidation of power over the boundaries and standards of childhood mirrors international consolidation of authority over human rights in general after World War II, as the international community increasingly became the arbiter of acceptable treatment of citizens by states. In this paper, I argue that a globalized model of childhood that emerged after World War II was important to the development of the international system, serving to consolidate power and legitimize international institutions and order. I further examine the growth of this globalized model of childhood, one codified today in international law and developed primarily in Europe and the United States in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries and diffused from these points of origin throughout the world. The paper uses the development of domestic and international law forbidding the death penalty for child offenders as a point of entry into the study of childhood, children's rights and the international system. It investigates the mechanisms of diffusion for the norm against the child death penalty and identifies three principal mechanisms of norm diffusion based on the findings of case studies and their types of law; colonial influence; temporal period of abolition; and participation in international legal regimes and institutions.
Introduction
When we speak of children in the field of international relations, we tend to speak of them as war victims, child soldiers and child laborers. They have been the bystanders, beneficiaries or casualties of the changing international order in the post-World War II era.
Children inhabit a specific narrative in global society, their image invoking ideas of innocence, vulnerability and the need for protection. As a result, children became the symbols of many international institutions devoted to advancing human rights and democracy around the world in the last few decades of the 20 th century, yet they have been largely absent from the international relations literature itself.
i I seek in this paper to theorize children as a historically important part of state consolidation and international order and as worthy recipients of greater attention in the field of international relations. I examine the development of domestic and international law forbidding the death penalty for child offenders as a point of entry into the history of children, childhood and the international system. I argue that the widespread process of state consolidation that took place in the late 19 th century and throughout the 20 th century-a process whereby the state began to regulate large swaths of civil and private life, including children's lives-was aided by the development of the 'global child,' a figure that required steadily increasing levels of protection by the state, and later, by the international community. These protections were extended even to the least sympathetic children, those who committed the most egregious crimes, making the diffusion of norms and law about the child death penalty particularly illustrative of wide-scale state consolidation around the world. Protections for child criminals over the last century and a half were also illustrative of international consolidation-or the merging of disparate sources of authority over children into more centralized international institutions, such as the United Nations Children's Fund or UNICEF.
For society to protect infants, toddlers, youth and even teenagers who pose no physical threat to the community at large, ii there is little public controversy or debate. For society to protect child offenders whose crimes if committed by an adult could result in the death penalty, however, is far more expressive of a common construction of children and childhood. The abolition of the death penalty for child offenders-a ban found in 96 percent of states at the end of the 20 th century-is therefore a bold policy position, suggesting that the boundaries of childhood are inviolable and that there is nothing that a child can do, no crime too brutal or too violent, to revoke the protection childhood affords.
In this paper, I argue that a globalized model of childhood that emerged after World War II was important to the development of the international system, serving to consolidate power and legitimize international institutions and order. I further examine the growth of this model, one codified today in international law and developed primarily in Europe and the United States in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries and diffused from these points of origin throughout the world. Regarding the abolition of the child death penalty, norms and law forbidding the penalty for child offenders were specifically advanced by the British and French colonial powers. I present in this paper my dataset consisting of dates of abolition of the penalty and thereby explain the process by which a specific construction of childhood emerged, spread through bureaucratic methods of state organization, and was globalized. Yet in tracking the development of a global or universal model of childhood, I do not suggest that the model is found everywhere, only that it was and is presented to world society as if it were universal, as though it applies to all, regardless of locality or context.
Although the global diffusion of a specific construction of childhood is compelling as both a historical study and political exercise, why should international relations scholars care about the evolution of childhood in society or about the international diffusion of norms and law protecting children? In an age marked by terrorism, international war and economic turmoil-a period when security and economic matters would seem to trump all other issues-why should we concern ourselves with children and international efforts to protect them? I suggest that we should not underestimate or give short shrift to the dramatic social promotion of childhood over the last century and a half. Children were re-imagined and redefined from the legal property of their fathers to internationally protected and even 'sacrilized' citizens of the international community-their position enshrined in dozens of international legal texts and in national law (Cunningham, 1995; Zelizer, 1994) . The transformation of children from legal nonentities into a distinct, cloistered and highly protected class was remarkable, challenging and ultimately serving to alter many of the core precepts of law and social organization in societies around the world. In effect, the promotion of childhood triggered such profound changes in family structure and state organization that by the end of the 20 th century, legal distinctions between children by race, class and gender were discarded in favor of a universal model of children's rights.
The state of the field
Unlike other social sciences that focus attention on children, international relations has yet to fully theorize the position of children and the development of norms and law about childhood in global society. Children are largely absent from the international relations literature apart from the child conflict iii and child labor literatures iv and more recently from the emerging body of literature on child citizenship. v The children in these literatures are mostly victims-of war, poverty, abuse and neglect. Relatively little has been said about children as rights holders or about the role that ideas about children and childhood have played in the shaping of international order. Important work in recent years has begun to remedy this exclusion, especially research identifying a link between norms and law about childhood and power in the international system (Lewis, 1998; Pupavac, 2001; Watson, 2006; Van Bueren, 2011; Fass, 2011) . This paper is situated within this discourse. It seeks to reveal the importance of the construction of children and childhood to the development of the international system after World War II, and specifically considers the impact of children as rights holders on the process of state consolidation and on international institutions.
On the broader topic of children in general, sociological institutionalists argue that childhood is a social construction, one that has been built (and continues to be built) on a global scale. This view is consistent with that of scholars in international relations and law, constructivists and international legal theorists included, who contend that citizens and legal subjects are constructed over time (Adler, 2002; Barnett, 2005; Hopf, 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Onuf, 1989; Onuf, 2002; Zimring, 1982 
According to constructivists in international relations, norms have lifecycles consisting of stages of emergence, acceptance and internalization. The emergence period is distinguished from the internalization period (or period of widespread adoption) by a stage of rapid acceptance or support for the norm. This acceptance period is commonly called the cascade, when large clusters of norm adoption are observable (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) .
The norm abolishing the death penalty for child offenders had two cascades-two periods of rapid adoption-as captured in Figure 1 below. The second cascade is larger than the first, with more states adopting the norm and a higher rate of adoption.
FIGURE 1: THE NUMBER OF STATES THAT ABOLISHED THE DEATH PENALTY FOR CHILD OFFENDERS, BY YEAR viii
Beginning in the 1960s, a first cascade of countries outlawed the penalty for child offenders (either by limiting the penalty to those 18 and older or by abolishing it outright-see Table 1 above on the two paths to abolition). This trend was driven by the rapid decolonization that took With the datasets collected and the norm's lifecycle mapped, I then organized these states into categories by dominant mechanism of diffusion-or the mechanism to which the norm's adoption can be principally attributed. I determined these mechanisms of diffusion based on the findings of my case studies and their types of law (common, civil, religious), colonial influence, temporal period of abolition and participation in international legal regimes and institutions.
Through the case studies, three mechanisms of diffusion became evident: whereby the country's leaders enthusiastically invited Western legal scholars to draft laws that included restricting the death penalty to those 18 and older, as discussed in more detail below.
Although the mechanisms listed above correspond roughly with the temporal periods of early-, cascade-and late-period adoption, this paper is organized by mechanism of diffusion.
This method offered a more efficient way of presenting the findings, as the temporal spread of the norm does not explain its processes of diffusion: Different mechanisms of diffusion were evident in abolitionist countries across periods. Furthermore, there was no period-early, cascade or late-that was associated with a single mechanism of diffusion (See Figure 2 below).
Some mechanisms were more commonly found in certain periods, however; for example, the influence of colonial law was greater during the cascades than in any other period. 
The Child and the State
The abolition of the death penalty for child offenders under the age 18 was part of a larger and longer-term trend of law and policy reform to protect children. (Cole, 2005: 273; Donnelly, 2003) . The goal of the liberal state was national progress, defined principally by economic growth (and driven by the harnessing of available resources for profit and gain), and, eventually, by a higher quality of life for the state's citizens (Meyer, 2004: 43) .
A global trend in national policies toward progress and justice naturally shaped the application of the death penalty. Types of torture accompanying the penalty were limited in the West in the latter half of the 18 th century (Hunt, 2007: 76) A new wave of colonialism in the 19 th and early 20 th centuries demanded a broadening of the idea and application of rights from the national to the universal in order to confer legitimacy on the colonialist enterprise (Pagden, 2003: 177-178) . Nineteenth-century colonialism was justified under the guise of spreading 'civilization' and 'civilized' culture; a prelude to this effort was a return to thinking of rights in terms of the laws of nature, such that cultures that did not exhibit the same norms or customs held by 'civilized' people could be "dispossessed by those who do" (Pagden, 2003: 183-184) . The result was that rights could only be understood within the context of 'civilization,' as defined by the Europeans, and by a particular political order, representative government (Pagden, 2003: 190) . This trend toward universalism was still limited, however, by citizenship in a state. As such, the laws of nature could be applied to the colonies, via the expansion of colonialism, but the colonized themselves had no say in the matter.
The dual goals of progress and welfare were made explicit in the colonialism that defined the period: British and French colonialism were justified on these pillars. Empires would acquire colonies and (ostensibly) prepare them for entry in the global market, while harvesting their resources to enrich themselves. These empires also felt a duty to expose their colonies to cultural 'enlightenment' though the imposition of Christianity and metropolitan customs, norms and values. This was the civilizing mission, and it involved children in important ways, as will be seen.
Death penalty practice provides an interesting lens through which to examine colonialism's civilizing mission. The British, for example, used the death penalty in their colonies to instill fear and the rule of law. But apart from the Mau Mau rebellion-when an anticolonial force in British East Africa rose up against the British in the 1950s-they were careful to distance themselves from the act of capital punishment (Hynd, 2008: 416) . The British were sensitive to criticism of the death penalty and its savage nature and sought to sanitize it through reforms, even while complete abolition was being sought at home (Hynd, 2008: 417) . These pressures originated from the metropole, or mother country, because "those who believed themselves to be civilized had a duty not to behave towards 'backwards' or 'barbarian' peoples in a cruel and 'inhuman' manner" (Pagden, 2003: 191) . In other words, the British had to walk a fine line between fear and charity.
It was precisely this unsustainable conflict between the need to instill fear and to demonstrate imperial benevolence that led both to the demise of the British Empire in Africa and to the protection of children. Both the British and French empires felt growing pressure from their citizens to do more for the people of the colonies, and this pressure especially concerned young girls who were in 'moral danger.' Compulsory marriage, genital mutilation and child marriage upset metropolitan sensitivities and ultimately forced colonial governments to intervene in traditional and family law, something they had long sought to avoid. (Stoler, 1989; Stoler, 1992; Burton, 1998; Grier, 1994; Fourchard, 2006) . Colonial intervention in family law further inflamed tensions between the colonizers and the colonized. After World War II, colonialism was widely seen as morally bankrupt, and its rapid disintegration meant that a new international order was needed, one based on human rights that could be ensured against states or regimes.
The liberal state and the child
The development of a liberal state devoted to national progress and the welfare of its citizenry was aided by the promotion of the natural and social sciences in the 19 th and 20 th centuries. The emergence of a professional class of scientists as well as a preoccupation with objectivity through scientific methods in the 19 th century drove efforts toward progress in the liberal state (Bloch, 2003; Daston and Galison, 1992) . These experts claimed the ability to separate the normal from the abnormal, the desirable from the undesirable, and the moral from the amoral (Bloch, 2003: 16) . As a result, a single standard of normality emerged that allowed states to develop national policies to ensure the 'normal' and to address the 'abnormal' child.
In delineating a class of persons, the idea of childhood fostered by Europeans and
Americans was co-constitutive of ideas about how children should be treated. As concerns were raised by child advocates (increasingly in the 19 th century but also much earlier) about child abuse and neglect, the state intervened. The new interest in child welfare validated and institutionalized ideas about childhood as a vulnerable period of life when children need protection, structure and guidance. Protection came in the form of statutes that outlawed neglect and abuse; structure and guidance were provided by educational institutions, reformatories, industrial schools, church, and, decreasingly, places of employment.
State institutions were established to determine the extent of abuse and neglect and the required manner of state intervention. Abuse and neglect, however, were difficult to gauge without benchmarks. Child advocates, quick to use science to inform their actions, encouraged and supported the attention paid to children by science. Doctors established guidelines for nutrition, hygiene, welfare and psychological well-being (Baistow, 1995: 22; Hendrik, 1997: 12) .
Social scientists developed curricula; investigated the effects of child labor, abuse and neglect;
and advanced theories about children's distinct nature. Developmental psychology, in particular, "offered new, scientifically constructed indices by which 'normal development' could be quantitatively as well as qualitatively distinguished from the 'subnormal' or 'abnormal.' " (Baistow, 1995: 26-27 ). These guidelines progressively became part of the dogma of childhood as competing norms, especially those not legitimized by science, were discarded.
In line with theories of agentic constructivism, x standards of behavior toward children evolved as ideas about childhood evolved. One of the principal ideas that developed in the West in the 19 th and early 20 th centuries was that children were less culpable for the crimes they commit and should not be given adult penalties such as the death penalty. As scientific methods to study children were applied outside the West, the model of the globalized child began to gain purchase. Western studies of children in the periphery provided support for the contention that all children experience the same stages of development, and have the same requirements for good health, education, leisure and need for labor restrictions (Bloch and ebrary Inc., 2006; Burman 2008; Sen 2004a Sen , 2004b Sen , 2005 Sen , 2007 .
Eventually, a single standard of childhood was constructed predominately in the Westthe standard of a globalized child with the same needs, abilities, desires and limitations regardless of citizenship. Yet the idea that childhood is a social construction says little about how it came to be the particular social construction enshrined in state and international law today or about how a specific aspect of the model, such as reduced culpability, came to be integral to our understanding of children's capacities. Sociological institutionalists have argued that since all states share the goal of economic progress, they are highly susceptible to new ideas about how best to achieve this progress (Meyer, 2004: 43) . A focus on children as a tool of development became common in the 19 th century, as states such as the United Kingdom recognized a connection between children's health and the ability of the empire to win wars (Baistow, 1995) .
The interest in children and childhood also served the goal of progress, as educating and caring for children as the future heirs of the nation came to be seen as a sound investment in the stability and prosperity of the state. By the 1960s, a focus on children as a key part of national development had become global wisdom.
Children were also a tool of empire, as missionaries, travelers and scientists used Western ideas about children and families to measure the " 'civilization' and 'culture,' and the 'nature' of primitive families and childhood in exotic places" (Bloch, 2003: 16) . According to Marianne Bloch, in her research of curricula, studies of children in the colonies and other cultures outside the West "produced 'new' types of 'advanced' and 'progressive' knowledge about childhood, the family, and schooling" that resulted in the discovery of "universal truths" about children and their development (Bloch, 2006: 8) . Satadru Sen has shown in his studies of juvenile orphanages and reform schools in 19 th -and 20 th -century India that the children in government facilities became the subjects of countless studies and experiments designed to identify the core, natural, universal child by separating the child from his or her racial identity (Sen 2004a (Sen , 2004b (Sen , 2005 (Sen , 2007 . In a study of the British in Nigeria, Laurent Fourchard argues that the establishment of the Social Welfare Office in 1941 created juvenile delinquents as a distinct group of criminals (Fourchard, 2006: 115) . The colonial administration and judicial system in Nigeria actually "legislated 'juvenile delinquency' into existence" (Fourchard, 2006: 116) . Moreover, the construction of juvenile delinquency and the preoccupation with the 'moral danger' of young girls was not unique to Nigeria or even to the British colonies, as "special judicial machinery for the 'treatment of juvenile offenders' was also established" in the empires of the French, Belgians and Portuguese in the 1940s and 1950s (Fourchard, 2006: 116) .
By the 20 th century, the idea of childhood diffused to the colonies was age-specific, meaning that it was not defined by behavior, rite, ritual, race, class, status or gender, but rather by age. The age 18 became widely accepted as the upper age limit of childhood in criminal codes after World War II, and this boundary was extended to areas of child protection even outside criminal matters. The model of childhood that took shape after World War II was not initially one that bestowed many rights upon children, but rather one that imposed duties upon adults.
Children were, however, crucial to national identity, considered vulnerable and in need of care, and were increasingly seen as less culpable for their actions than adults.
The acculturation of colonies to Western legal and political systems, carried out most extensively by the French in Algeria, included an inherent logic of state consolidation over citizens, including children. Laws prohibiting the child death penalty were commonly found in criminal codes, and the British took the lead in standardizing criminal procedures and sanctions.
At independence, many former colonies had laws prohibiting the death penalty for child offenders under the age 18. These colonies maintained after independence, at least initially, the state organizational structure they had inherited, including the prohibition of the child death penalty and other protections for children. Many even increased protections for children in the first few decades of statehood. These states had internalized aspects of the colonial state model that not only recognized the validity of children's protection, but also could not imagine a solution to issues of child welfare outside of law. They were, in effect, socialized to predominantly Anglo-French ideas of child protection (including protection from adult criminal penalties) and to the role of the state in guaranteeing it.
The widespread standardization of the treatment of young criminals by the British 
Stages of diffusion
The following sections will present the primary mechanisms of diffusion for the norm against the child death penalty: principled activism, coercive socialization and the globalization of childhood. This section also discusses laggards, or states that were able to resist or reject the norm.
Principled activism
The emergence of the norm against the death penalty for child offenders was the result of efforts by child advocates and death penalty opponents in a handful of countries in the 19 th and 20 th centuries. The movement was especially strong in the United Kingdom, where norm entrepreneurs served as ministers in government, social workers, intellectuals, scientists and lawyers, although I found comparable evidence of early activism in France, Japan and the United
States. These norm entrepreneurs advanced ideas about children's vulnerability, reduced culpability and need of care. As described above, these conclusions about children were justified by scientific studies on the nature, characteristics and capabilities of children, studies that diagnostically separated 'normal' from 'abnormal' childhood and legislated accordingly.
Concern for the treatment of child offenders was part of the broader humanistic trend toward progress and justice, since children represented the future of the nation as well as reflected its sense of compassion and its regard for the welfare of its citizens. Reforms for children in the United Kingdom, for example, came out of state reforms that limited the authority of the monarchy and the ruling class, and prescribed change in numerous aspects of society, including its penal system.
Although principled activism for children was present in all of the cases, it was especially important for early and late adopters. Some late adopters like the United States and Pakistan required additional late-stage activism against the child death penalty to bring these states into compliance with international law and the global, codified model of childhood.
In the U.S. case, the combination of two mechanisms of diffusion-principled activism and the globalization of childhood-is attributable to the United States' unique history of child protection efforts. Under the leadership of child advocates, the United States became a laboratory for the development of norms of child protection in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries, especially in the area of juvenile justice, before losing ground as the 20 th century progressed (Linde, 2011) . The pattern of U.S. diffusion then came full circle, with a new generation of domestic activists emerging late in the 20 th century to pressure the United States to comply with the international norm against the child death penalty. These activists successfully leveraged the global model of childhood, which included the ban on the penalty for child offenders.
Coercive socialization
The colonies of the British and French underwent a process of 'coercive socialization,' whereby norms, legal principles and rubrics of state organization were diffused to the colonies.
The British and French established bureaucracies that administered colonial law and drafted and enforced public policy based on their own legal principles. These laws and policies specified the relationship between the state and the child, one that would include criminal sanctions. In the four Middle Eastern and North African case studies (Algeria, Kenya, Tanzania/Tanganyika, and Tunisia), I found four steps of coercive socialization that were not necessarily linear: First, the British and French colonial powers built bureaucracies that allowed them to efficiently achieve their goals. These goals varied among the colonial powers and colonies, but they were primarily the goals of progress (wealth accumulation) and justice (mission civilatrice or white man's burden).
The second step of coercive socialization was a form of legal imperialism, whereby the British and French enforced laws derived from their own legal systems in which individuals were the central legal subjects. As stated above, the British were especially motivated to develop a single criminal code and procedure throughout their colonies. French colonial law was much more complicated. It varied to a far greater extent by colony, time period, offence and offender.
In some cases, French law was applied directly to the colony; in others, there were a number of different legal sources for a particular area.
Third, child law and policy developed, straddling disparate areas of law, government and custom. Invariably, these laws and policies dictated a paternal relationship between the state and the child that would eventually (in many former colonies) usurp parental, tribal or community power over children. Law governing children's lives developed primarily in two areas: criminal law and family law. Restrictions to the death penalty by age were typically found in criminal codes or criminal procedure codes and, with a brief lag of a few decades in some cases, eventually reflected the penalty's age limit in the metropole. Family law mandated birth and death registrations and regulated marriage, divorce and child support. Although both the British and the French were hesitant to impinge upon family law, both empires eventually did so to some degree.
Fourth, colonial society was socialized over time to the goals of the British and French colonial powers (to the twin goals of progress and justice), to the method of state organization (bureaucracy), and to other predominately Western legal values and principles. These societies were thus socialized to the authority of the state over children and to the various protections and guarantees that state authority entailed, prohibitions of the child death penalty among them.
Evidence for socialization is found in the choice by many colonies to continue the protections for children begun under the empire, and even to increase them upon independence. Although some countries, such as Tunisia and Tanzania, would eventually revoke some of these protections, this reversal would not come until later.
One case study, Japan, had some similarities with the colonial cases. Under occupation after World War II, Japan reformed its criminal law based largely on its occupiers' AngloAmerican legal system. The occupation period resulted in an unprecedented number of legal advisers that set out to reconstruct the Japanese state and reshape its legal practices (Chen, 2003: 52-53) . Although different in circumstances from the colonial cases, Japan's acculturation to Anglo-American legal norms (but not the common law system) was nonetheless coercive.
Although the child death penalty had at the time only been abolished in the United Kingdom and not in the United States, Japan's abolition of the penalty corresponded closely with child protection trends in the West in general and served as a continuation of child protection efforts from Japan's pre-war history.
Coercive socialization through law and state organization is not the typical way we understand coercion or socialization in international relations. Legal coercion is different from military force or economic aid. Law imposes a society's values, dictates legitimate and illegitimate behavior, creates social units and levels of authority, and, to a degree, establishes the agency of actors within the system by recognizing (or failing to recognize) their legal status as individuals (or groups) with a given identity. In my study, I found that the British and French colonial powers established an identity for children apart from that of their parents, kin, clan, religion and even gender in Algeria, Kenya, Tanzania/Tanganyika and Tunisia. The legal category 'child,' as a Western construction, was universal and applied equally (in law) to all children below the age 18 in these colonies. Although law as a type of coercion may seem less distasteful or violent at first blush than other forms of coercion, it can be more powerful than an occupying force. By defining and organizing social relations in the Western image, colonial powers socialized the colonies in a way that dictated, to a large degree, their structure and characteristics after independence.
As mentioned, there was one anomalous case study, Ethiopia, which was similar to the cases of Algeria, Japan, Kenya, Tanzania/Tanganyika and Tunisia. The mechanism of diffusion in Ethiopia can best be thought of as 'voluntary socialization,' whereby the state enthusiastically and proactively sought out Western aid in the development of its legal system. The post-war period was a vibrant time of legal development in Ethiopia, with the drafting of the 1955
Constitution and six additional codes in the 10 years that followed. All of these codes were either crafted by foreign lawyers or "inspired by foreign sources," including British, French, Indian, Israeli, Italian and Swiss sources (Vanderlinden, 1966-7: 257; Fisher, 1969: ix) . The penal code, which included the ban on the child death penalty, was drafted by a Swiss jurist, Jean Graven, and had numerous foreign influences; large parts of it were based on the U.S. Constitution (Franklin, 1961: 267) .
Through colonialism and the diffusion of Anglo-French law, legal systems and principles, children were given a place in the state order as individuals. State authority over children usurped parental, clan, kinship or tribal control and created children as legal subjects that were equal to one another under the law throughout the state. As these laws and policies created child subjects in the image of the metropolitan child, the beliefs of child advocates, international aid workers and development specialists that all children possess the same nature, needs and characteristics were confirmed. This growing consensus on the common nature of children reinforced the efforts of international institutions, such as UNICEF, to make children a prominent part of development initiatives and inspired the movement for international children's rights that would begin in the 1970s. Former colonies of the British and French thus entered an international system in which the only legitimate model of statehood was the Western liberal model that created children as legal subjects, advanced the notion of a universal childhood, established the state (and increasingly, the international community) as the rightful guardian of children's interests, and affirmed the role of the rapidly developing international community in promoting and securing children's welfare.
Globalized childhood
In Second, world conferences, meetings, special sessions and summits, some sponsored by the United Nations, were also key to diffusing a global model of childhood to states. These prestigious and influential events "display world culture under construction" (Lechner and Boli, 2005: 84) . These meetings and events became common in the 19 th century, but since World War II, they have taken on a more symbolic, prominent and global role, offering an authoritative stance on a wide range of issues relevant to international institutions (Lechner and Boli, 2005: 84) . Through the mobilization, organization, assessment and follow-up they entail, U.N.
meetings, in particular, have become a type of "secular ritual," expressing a global consensus on global matters (Lechner and Boli, 2005: 89) . The most important meeting on children in the last CRC, while the age parameters of the norm of abolition for child offenders remained the same.
The model of childhood advanced by the CRC was also significantly more detailed, complex and wider in scope than previous attempts to enumerate rights and protections for children.
Although children and childhood became a new focal point of international human rights efforts in the last half of the 20 th century, the issue of the child death penalty remained obscure until Amnesty International and its American chapter (along with other national and international NGOs) took it up in the 1980s and 1990s. Amnesty International's campaign against the child death penalty was international, but it focused its resources on the United States, although China and Pakistan (two other case studies for this project), among other states, were also targeted.
Employing a moral authority derived from its legacy as a champion of human rights and harnessing the legitimacy of the emerging children's rights regime, Amnesty and others were able to put the issue of the child death penalty on the international human rights agenda.
The 1990 CRC began a period of intense international consolidation of authority over childhood, as international law and the institutions established to monitor it came to be viewed as the definitive authority on the treatment of children by the state. have grown in such a short time is plain. In the early years after World War II, international efforts targeting children were justified as emergency relief-on the basis of children's physical needs for proper nutrition, sanitation, vaccines, etc., needs supported by studies in the natural sciences. As international efforts expanded in the 1960s and 1970s, the child was increasingly linked (now by the social sciences) to the development of the nation and to the ushering of states into the international community as economic partners. With the growth of the international children's rights regime in the 1990s, there is no need for further justification to protect children.
Children are rights holders, and international law alone serves to justify attention and assistance.
Conclusion
International law on children's rights, in important ways, usurps state authority over the ideology of childhood, establishing complicated and exacting standards that all states should adopt. Although international law concerning children lacks an enforcement mechanism, it nonetheless serves as a means of confronting states about their child policies and forces them to address these norms as they participate in international institutions. The international community's enshrinement of children as rights holders and consolidation of power over the boundaries and standards of childhood mirrors international consolidation of human rights in general after World War II, as the international community increasingly became the arbiter of acceptable treatment of citizens by states.
Although I am certain that the idea of childhood did not originate in the West, as at least some type of recognition of the differences between very young children and adults appears to be common across cultures, it is evident that numerical, age-based legal norms about children diffused globally from the West. The British and French, in particular, advocated and enforced legal norms against the child death penalty in their colonies. These norms expressed ideas about the nature of children that formed the basis of a model of childhood. This model, characterized by the immaturity, vulnerability and reduced culpability of children (biologically, psychologically, intellectually), by the upper age limit of 18 years, and by a relationship between the state and the child in which the state assumed responsibility for the child's welfare, became the international model found in the CRC and advanced by U.N. organs such as UNICEF.
After World War II, children fast became part of the civilizing rhetoric of the international community, and the momentum of the postwar zeitgeist helped to spread protections for children, even though international law was slow to develop in this area. An international children's rights regime began modestly with the series of conventions and declarations about children and with the ICCPR in the 1960s and 1970s and was then bolstered and broadened in scope with the ratification of the CRC in the 1990s. The development of rights and protections for children in international law meant that states no longer had complete control over the way children were treated. Childhood was now an international idea. In a very real way, the state was divested of full authority over children since state policies and practices were now seen as a legitimate international concern.
The shift in authority over children from the state to the international community marked the completion of a greater and more gradual pattern of divestment from the father, who was sovereign of the family, and the tribe, to the state and finally from the state to the international community. This power over childhood is ideological. By articulating standards of childhood, the international community assumes the power to define childhood, which includes identifying areas of protection, setting the scope of protections, identifying violations of those protections and establishing processes of adjudication when violations occur. This postwar pattern, whereby the international community took ideological control over the content, scope and measure of human rights norms and principles, created the modern rights regime, a body in progress of legal norms that includes the prohibition against the child death penalty.
